Regulatory Incrementalism and Moral Choices: A Comment on Adlerian Welfarism by Rodriguez, Daniel B.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 9
2000
Regulatory Incrementalism and Moral Choices: A
Comment on Adlerian Welfarism
Daniel B. Rodriguez
dbr@dbr.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Regulatory Incrementalism and Moral Choices: A Comment on Adlerian Welfarism, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2000) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol28/iss1/9





REGULATORY INCREMENTALISM AND MORAL CHOICES:  
A COMMENT ON ADLERIAN WELFARISM 
 
































Recommended citation: Daniel B. Rodriguez, Regulatory Incrementalism and Moral 
Choices: A Comment on Adlerian Welfarism, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 375 (2000).  
375 
REGULATORY INCREMENTALISM 
AND MORAL CHOICES: 
A COMMENT ON ADLERIAN WELFARISM 
DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ* 
 I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................  375 
 II. ADLER’S WELFARISM...........................................................................................  376 
 III. REGULATORY INCREMENTALISM.........................................................................  379 
 IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH COST-BENEFIT WELFARISM .............................................  386 
 V. CONCLUSION: WELFARISM AND REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION.......................  387 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Matthew Adler’s fine paper on welfarism and regulation tackles 
ambitiously and elegantly the normative foundations of modern regu-
lation.1 This most recent paper is part of a nice triptych begun with 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis2 and Incommensurability and Cost-
Benefit Analysis.3 In these articles, Professor Adler lays out a deeply 
reflective case for a welfarist theory of regulation.4 Moreover, he 
makes the case, albeit more ambivalently, for cost-benefit analysis as 
a key part of the template for regulatory choice.5 In the conclusion to 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Professors Adler and Posner main-
tain that “[a]gencies should use [cost-benefit analysis] to evaluate the 
welfare effect of large projects,”6 qualifying, however, their recom-
mendation of its use because of potentially negative distributional 
consequences. Cost-benefit analysis, therefore, should not be used 
“where wealth differences between those who gain from the project 
and those who lose are substantial enough.”7 
                                                                                                                  
 * Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
 1. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of 
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241 (2000) [hereinafter Beyond Efficiency]. Professor 
Adler states: 
My focus will be legal scholarship, since it is legal scholars who, in recent years, 
have paid the most sustained attention to the problem of justifying regula-
tion—the problem of generating a moral theory of regulation in light of which 
general regulatory approaches, specific regulatory decisions, the design of regu-
latory agencies, and all other aspects of regulation can be evaluated as good or 
bad, right or wrong. 
Id. at 241-42. 
 2. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE 
L.J. 165 (1999). 
 3. Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1371 (1998) [hereinafter Incommensurability]. 
 4. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1; Incommensurability, supra note 3; Adler & 
Posner, supra note 2. 
 5. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1; Incommensurability, supra note 3; Adler & 
Posner, supra note 2. 
 6. Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 238. 
 7. Id. 
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 The contribution of the rather dense analytical paper for this Flor-
ida State University symposium is both to dismantle two of the stan-
dard normative accounts for regulation and administrative law, ac-
counts which Professor Adler classifies as neoclassical and proce-
duralist, and to point the way toward an avowedly welfarist account.8 
The careful, and mostly philosophical, analysis of this paper, like 
previous work by Professor Adler in this same vein, is a tour de force. 
Not only is it head and shoulders above much of the rather intuition-
ist, and often analytically slim, sort of theoretical work in the legal 
literature on regulation and administrative law, but it also has going 
for it that it is within a growing body of legal analysis which looks to 
economic analysis and more scientific methods to provide a richer 
substantive grounding to prescriptive regulation and regulatory the-
ory.9 Professor Adler’s work shows exactly what sort of value is added 
by bringing an able philosophical mind and technique to serious pub-
lic law problems. 
 The purpose of this Comment is to suggest ways in which more 
scrupulous attention to the nature and characteristics of modern 
regulatory decisionmaking and the role of institutions in structuring 
such decisionmaking might contribute to the omnibus welfarist ap-
proach to regulation. My claim is that the essentially incremental 
character of modern regulatory administration raises doubts about 
the utility of a welfarist set of criteria, whether cost-benefit analysis 
or some other technique.  
II.   ADLER’S WELFARISM 
 Professor Adler lays out, in lengthy detail, the case for welfarism 
as a superior normative talisman for regulatory choice.10 Sometimes 
this case is styled as arrestingly new and, therefore, as a signifi-
cantly different approach to realizing overall well-being through the 
regulatory system. 11 At other times, he admits that his approach is 
                                                                                                                  
 8. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 243-44. 
 9. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 
1981, 1984 (1998) (questioning the “pervasive reliance on [John] Morrall’s table in schol-
arly and political discussion of risk regulation”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Re-
inventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (evaluating President Clin-
ton’s Executive Order 12,866, suggesting “reforms that will simultaneously promote eco-
nomic and democratic goals”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM . L. REV. 941, 948 (1999) (stating 
that his “[a]rticle underscores the extent to which discounting raises analytically distinct 
issues in the cases of latent harms and harms to future generations, even though these two 
scenarios have generally been treated as manifestations of the same problem”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (1996) (stating that it is 
his “goal” to “explore the relation between health-health tradeoffs and the law, in an effort 
to see how governmental judgments . . . might be improved”). 
 10. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 288-336. 
 11. See id. at 241, 245, 335. 
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merely a form of “refurbished neoclassicism,” that is, a better way of 
both enhancing the (more perfected) preferences of individuals and 
increasing utility.12 In both its modest and immodest versions, this 
enterprise of solidifying the theoretical case for welfarism as the tal-
isman for regulatory choices strikes me as not only plausible but cor-
rect. In any event, it is an entirely defensible (and indeed Adler de-
fends it well) normative framework for assessing the performance of 
regulatory institutions in a modern state. Moreover, the smaller part 
of the thesis, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is mostly unnecessary and, 
on occasion, works at cross-purposes with a welfarist account, is 
completely persuasive on Adler’s account. 13 Also persuasive is Adler’s 
argument that Pareto-superiority provides one good basis for assess-
ing regulatory options but is, in the end, an entirely too risky ac-
count.14 
 The power of welfarist theory vis-à-vis proceduralist frameworks 
for regulatory choice seems likewise strong. If anything is to be 
faulted, it is that Professor Adler gives much too much attention to 
the “Big-P” Proceduralism in mainstream administrative law and 
regulation scholarship.15 The proceduralism of the sort described in 
the paper has few remaining adherents. The heyday of such strong 
proceduralism was the 1970s, when the work of key administrative 
law scholars fashioned the case for augmented procedures in regula-
tory decisionmaking,16 “hard look” review by federal courts, 17 and a 
dialogic conception of relationships among agencies, businesses, and 
interest groups. 18 By the time Richard Stewart wrote his seminal 
piece on the reformation of administrative law,19 such proceduralist 
conceptions were already on the retreat. 20 Significantly, even the 
hard look doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s was attached much more 
tightly to normative theories of enhanced regulatory performance 
                                                                                                                  
 12. Id. at 244, 289, 319-32. 
 13. See id. at 248-62. 
 14. See id. at 255-57. 
 15. See id. at 267-88. 
 16. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure Act, 29 
ADMIN. L. REV. 35 (1977). 
 17. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Portland Cement Ass’n 
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 
F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 18. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATION 47-49 (1988). 
 19. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (“The court should . . . not . . . impose upon the agency its own 
notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague undefined public 
good.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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than to the intrinsic values of due process and procedural justice.21 It 
is appropriate to note in a symposium organized by Professor Mark 
Seidenfeld that Professor Seidenfeld is among a fairly small group of 
administrative law scholars who are committed to a strong proce-
duralist vision of administrative agency decisionmaking.22 There are 
few Big-P Proceduralists left. 
 There remain, as Professor Adler acknowledges, strands of nor-
mative theory which may stand in the way of welfarism/refurbished 
neoclassicism. 23 Deontological, perfectionist, and distributive themes 
are significant aspects of contemporary regulatory theory.24 Adler de-
scribes these criteria as potential “partitions,” separating the space 
between avowedly welfarist theories of regulation and other, nonwel-
farist considerations. 25 While the gist of Adler’s prescriptive theoriz-
ing suggests that these partitions need not stand in the way of welfa-
rist approaches, it is not clear that these exceptions have not swal-
lowed the rule. After all, the attachment among theorists to deonto-
logical, rights-based themes in regulatory discourse is found in many 
different parts of the literature, including in scholarship calling for 
augmented welfare rights26 and that championing the environmental 
justice movement. 27 Significantly, this discourse runs against the 
grain of welfarist theories by injecting deep considerations of equity 
and substantive justice into the mix. To be sure, I suspect that in the 
end Professor Adler and I would agree that these deontological con-
siderations cannot adequately support modern regulatory theory. 
Yet, the persistence of rights-based theories at least raises the stakes 
associated with partitioning nonwelfarist considerations. We are left 
with the theoretical and empirical questions of how efficacious deon-
tological theories of regulation are. 
 As Professor Adler deploys his ammunition against theoretical 
targets, the relative attention he gives to largely anachronistic pro-
ceduralist theories versus the attention he gives to those raised in his 
discussion of partitions and partitioning is curious. 28 A caveat which 
                                                                                                                  
 21. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 213-64 (1990) (describing role of hard look review as 
facilitating “sound governance”). 
 22. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 23. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 288-89. 
 24. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 34-35 (1990). 
 25. Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19. 
 26. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES 274-83 (1994). 
 27. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The 
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) 
Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721 (1993). 
 28. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19, for a discussion o f partitioning. See 
also Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 243-45, for a discussion of these considerations in the 
context of cost-benefit analysis. 
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looms large in Professor Adler’s welfarist account is this: If one be-
lieves that prescriptive regulation ought to be evaluated based upon 
deontological, perfectionist, or distributive criteria (or presumably 
some combination of each), then welfarist approaches will predicta-
bly ring hollow.29 While Professor Adler rightly elides this even more 
fundamental question, it is worth noting that this too is a form of 
theoretical partitioning. How persuasive ought cost-benefit analysis 
be to anyone seriously concerned that regulation of a certain form 
and level is necessary to ensure the protection of certain individual 
or group rights, for example, the “right” to a clean environment? Is 
the upshot of Adler’s partitioning that cost-benefit analysis has abso-
lutely nothing to say to such a person? 
 This partitioning is less apparent in connection with distributive 
criteria, for in Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Professors Adler and 
Posner contemplate the introduction of certain distributive criteria 
into their configuration of cost-benefit analysis.30 In essence, then, 
they accept the inevitability that some of these other, nonwelfarist 
criteria will likely creep into an otherwise welfarist account of regu-
lation. Once these criteria have crept in, though, what is to keep 
nonwelfarist criteria mostly at bay? Why is not the gist of the theory 
that welfarism is part of an overall normative strategy? Of course, 
Adler has much more in mind. Yet, it is coming to terms with the 
scope of this partitioning and, more fundamentally, the relationship 
between welfarist theories and deontological, perfectionist, and dis-
tributive considerations that is presumably the next big stage in Pro-
fessor Adler’s ambitious effort to reconceptualize the modern theory 
of regulation. 
III.   REGULATORY INCREMENTALISM 
 I will assume that Professor Adler has in mind not an idealized, 
highly abstracted notion of regulatory politics and policymaking, but 
rather the real world of regulation in the modern administrative 
state. While eschewing any particular positive account of regulation, 
he does turn our attention to contemporary administrative regula-
tion. So what do we see when we turn our attention, with Professor 
Adler, to modern regulatory administration? 
 Fundamentally, we see that regulatory agencies act incremen-
tally. That is, they act upon the social or economic problem brought 
before them (frequently in the context of enforcement or litigation), 
and they craft regulatory strategies to deal with the particular issues 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19. 
 30. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 238-45. They state, “Agencies should use 
CBA to evaluate the welfare effect of large projects except where wealth differences be-
tween those who gain from the project and those who lose are substantial enough.” Id. at 
238. 
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raised. Moreover, regulatory policy exists in an environment made 
up of many institutions, each assigned different functions and each 
relating to one another in overlapping, cross-cutting, and frequently 
competitive ways. One of the ways in which regulatory agencies are 
distinguished from institutions such as the U.S. Congress is that 
agencies are created rather episodically and with an eye toward re-
sponding to categories of regulatory programs. Justice Stephen 
Breyer echoed the views of other regulation theorists when, a num-
ber of years ago, he proposed a large, omnibus regulatory agency 
which would be better suited to confront a range of social and eco-
nomic problems. 31 Breyer’s proposed agency had the capacity to con-
sider trade-offs and priorities and to develop comprehensive regula-
tory criteria; thus it would have been able to respond more success-
fully to these polycentric problems.32 Whatever the normative force of 
this injunction, what we are left with at the dawn of a new century in 
the United States of America is an alphabet soup of agencies and 
regulatory programs. We are thus left with a basically incremental 
process of regulatory administration. Moreover, it is a process that is 
profoundly political and subject to the turbulence of the economy, 
public opinion, and public choice. 
 It is not the case, to be sure, that regulatory incrementalism is an 
inherent and immutable characteristic of administrative behavior 
and performance. Professor Adler’s colleague, Professor Colin Diver, 
noted many years ago that there are competing paradigms of policy-
making and that agencies can and do adopt synoptic, as well as in-
crementalist, approaches. 33 The choice among these approaches in-
volves not only considerations of optimal regulatory strategy, as best 
this can be discerned by the agency, but also decidedly political 
choices by legislatures and affected interest groups. Synoptic strate-
gies presuppose both a sustainable body of information available to 
the agency and the legal authority and political will to employ this 
information in order to confront comprehensively important social 
and economic problems through innovative regulatory strategies. The 
model of the powerful New Deal agency, represented by the failed 
experiment of the National Recovery Administration,34 symbolizes 
this aspirational vision of the administrative state as the instrument 
of coherent, technocratic, and apolitical public policy. Synopticism 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 55-81 (1993).  
 32. See id. 
 33. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law , 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 393, 394-95 (1981). 
 34. The National Recovery Act of 1933 gave authorization to the President to bring 
together a National Recovery Administration to draft codes for more than 500 industries. 
Each Code was designed both to stabilize labor practices and to avoid destructive competi-
tion. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 196, 
196-97. 
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represents the choice not only to pursue more activist regulation, but 
also to empower agencies to bite off a rather large chunk of the social 
and economic problems which call for regulatory intervention. The 
nature and scope of the strategies available to the agency should re-
flect this hopeful and very much comprehensive view of regulation’s 
potential. 
 In addition to the choices agencies, legislators, and interest groups 
can make about synoptic versus incremental approaches, there are 
significant influences brought to bear by judicial review. The hard 
look doctrine was fashioned, after all, as an effort to encourage agen-
cies to act more synoptically.35 But over the past quarter century, 
courts have firmly sided with the incrementalist approach; synoptic 
decisionmaking has been all but abandoned. In its place, the federal 
courts have substituted a moderate form of hard look review, a re-
view which is tethered to statutory and, less reliably, common law 
requirements of well-reasoned decisionmaking. The integrity of pro-
cedural rules is to be respected by agencies, as are the imperatives of 
considering properly the factors which Congress and the agencies 
themselves have spelled out as necessary to pass legal muster. 
Pushed more deeply in the background, then, is the requirement of 
truly synoptic decisionmaking, a requirement which would have 
pushed agency decisionmaking away from incrementalism. 
 If regulatory incrementalism has persisted, it is not only because 
of the triumph of this approach in contemporary regulatory strategy 
and in administrative law, but also because there are elements in the 
practice of regulatory administration which make agencies tend to-
ward incrementalist strategies. Central to this claim is the basic de-
cisionmaking matrix for agencies in administration. Consider two es-
sential regulatory choices: Agencies make choices not only about 
what level of regulation is appropriate and what strategies to deploy 
in implementing their regulatory agenda, but also about whether to 
pursue one regulatory initiative or another. For simplicity’s sake, let 
us call these basic decisions of whether to regulate at all regulatory 
initiation or “RI” decisions. We can call other decisions, such as 
whether to use certain command-and-control devices or whether to 
set the maximum exposure level at .05 or .005, regulatory strategy or 
“RS” decisions. 
 From one perspective, RI and RS decisions are within the same 
analytic category in that they both involve regulatory choices. Surely 
we could apply a welfarist criterion to assessing both RI and RS deci-
sions; and there is nothing in Adler’s theoretical account which sug-
gests that such types of decisions would be evaluated differently with 
respect to this criterion. It bears noting that the practicalities of 
                                                                                                                  
 35. See SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 52-54. 
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these two types of decisions are different in the typical administra-
tive regulation context. Moreover, there are some significant differ-
ences drawn in contemporary administrative law doctrine which, at 
the very least, make the distinctions between RI and RS decisions sa-
lient. 
 With respect to the practicalities entailed, consider a standard de-
scription of a regulatory choice sequence. In their book on automobile 
safety regulation, Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst give us a wonder-
ful glimpse into the characteristics of both RI and RS decisions. 36 The 
key strategic dilemma for the early National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerned the choice between 
traditional command-and-control regulation emphasizing design 
and/or performance-based criteria and more adjudicatory responses 
such as recalls. 37 Lurking below the surface of these ubiquitous stra-
tegic dilemmas, however, were questions concerning whether the 
agency would intervene at all in certain matters of motor vehicle 
safety. For example, the NHTSA never seriously pursued strategies 
of driver behavior modification, even though such strategies were ar-
guably contemplated by Congress when enacting the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1965.38 Nor did NHTSA pursue regulation of school 
buses and other vehicles, therefore leaving significant risks unregu-
lated.39 Besides the banal explanation that there is only so much time 
and money to go around, it remains unexplained why the agency 
tackled any one regulatory initiative rather than another. Regardless 
of the positive reasons for activity and passivity with regards to any 
particular safety-related strategy, it is significant that these choices 
were, in the end, for the agency and Congress to make.40 
                                                                                                                  
 36. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
(1990). 
 37. See id. at 147-71. 
 38. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 1, 80 
Stat. 718, repealed by  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994); see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36, 
at 2, 230-31. 
 39. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36, at 141-46. 
 40. An example of an instance in which the RI and RS decisions overlap completely is 
provided by the Supreme Court’s decision in the tobacco case, FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). That case involved the decision by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), ultimately invalidated by the Supreme Court, to regulate 
cigarettes as a “nicotine-delivery device” and hence a drug. The RI decision made by the 
FDA followed nearly a century of regulatory abstinence. In examining the scope of author-
ity for the FDA to regulate cigarettes, the Supreme Court noted that it would be illogical 
for the FDA to conclude that cigarettes were a drug susceptible to regulation under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but then to stop short of imposing a ban. In essence, the 
Court said that the RS decision followed from the RI decision. Only one of two regulatory 
outcomes were possible: Either the agency must impose a complete ban, if it were accurate 
in concluding that Congress vested in the agency the legal authority to regulate; or, in the 
alternative, the agency must not regulate at all in this area. See id. at 1302. 
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 Modern administrative law doctrine has reinforced the distinction 
between RI and RS decisions. In Heckler v. Chaney,41 for example, 
the Court considered a decision of the Food and Drug Administration 
to refrain from enforcing certain administrative regulations regard-
ing the safe use of drugs in connection with lethal injections adminis-
tered in the State of Texas. 42 The Court upheld the agency’s judg-
ment concerning the proper allocation of enforcement resources and 
hence enforcement discretion, pegging this judgment on the rather 
amorphous standard of section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act43 which makes unreviewable by the courts decisions 
“committed to agency discretion by law.”44 As a piece of black letter 
law, the Chaney case is an example of the Court’s willingness to dis-
tinguish between agency enforcement decisions, in which choices 
over resource allocation are especially salient and agency discretion 
is most valued, and the decisions in which an agency in fact enforces 
a regulation but does so “unreasonably.”45 
 One way to make sense of this distinction is to evaluate the way 
in which the Court is sorting RI from RS decisions. RI decisions are 
the products of the quintessentially incremental nature of agency de-
cisionmaking. Agencies are supposed to husband their resources and 
step into policymaking only where the presumption of caution is 
overcome by the imperative of taking regulatory action. This impera-
tive may, of course, result from legislative command, as in those rare 
instances in which the legislature truly demands action. Or it may 
result from the imperatives of social or economic needs, all of which 
point in the direction of agency action. Chaney illustrates the judici-
ary’s unwillingness to enter aggressively into that determination. 
Some of this reticence may, as Justice Rehnquist notes in Chaney, be 
the result of the fact that there is “no law to apply” and, therefore, 
that courts have no textual basis for displacing agency reasoning.46 
Additionally, some of this reticence may result from judgments of 
comparative institutional incompetence. Lurking in the background 
                                                                                                                  
 41. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 42. See id. at 823-25. 
 43. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994). 
 44. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837-38. 
 45. See id. at 831-32 (noting the “general unsuitability” of a decision not to enforce for 
judicial review and stressing the “complicated balancing” of factors, including resource al-
location).  
 46. Id. at 829-33. The Court stated: 
Similarly, the Secretary’s decision here does not fall within the exception for 
action “committed to agency discretion.” This is a very narrow exception. . . . 
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is 
applicable in those rare instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad 
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.” 
Id. at 830 (quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision and a Senate Report on the 
APA). 
384  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:375 
 
of these judicial judgments, however, is a concern with the essen-
tially incrementalist character of modern regulatory administration. 
 Regulatory incrementalism looms large in another key adminis-
trative law decision, decided only two years before Chaney, Motor 
Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.47 That case involved the Secretary of Transportation’s 
decision to rescind the passive restraint requirement in the early 
days of the Reagan administration.48 Before the Court turned 
squarely to the agency’s reasoning process, concluding that the 
agency acted unreasonably and in violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,49 it considered whether agency decisions to deregulate 
would be subject to a different standard of review.50 
 Significantly, the case for a different standard came from both 
ends of the ideological spectrum. Those concerned that the Reagan 
administration was threatening to roll back health and safety regula-
tion counseled a standard of strict scrutiny for deregulatory deci-
sions; the proper baseline, in this account, was regulation and, there-
fore, efforts to turn back the regulatory clock should be subject to es-
pecially searching review.51 Others maintained that the baseline was 
properly no regulation, that is, the free market. As a consequence, ef-
forts at deregulation merely restored the status quo ante and were to 
be subject, then, to more deferential review.52 The Supreme Court in 
State Farm rejected both of these approaches, instead grounding its 
review on the same standard as with any other regulatory decision.53 
What was critical in State Farm is that the agency had made a 
choice, not that this choice was in the direction of augmenting or de-
creasing the level of regulation existing before this choice was made. 
 The Department of Transportation’s decision was fundamentally 
an RS decision. Therefore, the Court was quite willing to subject the 
                                                                                                                  
 47. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 48. See id. at 34. 
 49. See id. at 57 (holding that the agency “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned 
analysis’”).  
 50. See id. at 41-44. 
 51. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
520-24 (1985) (describing the arguments and setting out reasons why earlier cases rejected 
this view). In State Farm itself, however, State Farm did not argue for a heightened stan-
dard of review, but it specifically asserted that “arbitrary and capricious” review was 
proper. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 45. The Court of Appeals, though, had “intensif[ied] 
the scope of its review” based on Congressional acts prior to the attempted deregulation. 
Id. at 44. 
 52. See the discussion in U.S. Government’s brief. Brief for the Federal Parties at 16, 
State Farm (Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398) (arguing that “[t]he Safety Act . . . embodies a 
congressional presumption against regulation”). See also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41 (re-
jecting the argument by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association that a less exacting 
standard than “arbitrary and capricious” would be proper). 
 53. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 40-46. The Court explicitly stated, “While . . . it may 
be easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action, the direction in which an agency 
chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial review . . . .” Id. at 42. 
2000]  MORAL CHOICES  385 
 
agency’s choice among regulatory strategies to a reasonably search-
ing standard of review. By contrast, the RI decision of the Food and 
Drug Administration in Chaney54 and, for that matter, the RI deci-
sions of the NHTSA in the era described by Mashaw and Harfst are 
cordoned off from all but a rather pro forma sort of scrutiny.55 Courts 
cede much of the discretion to agencies with regard to RI decisions 
because of the durable belief that agency decisionmaking is incre-
mental, involving a multitude of specific, and not especially trans-
parent, choices. The range of considerations which go into the choice 
between action and inaction are perhaps no more complex, after all, 
than the range of considerations which go into the choice among 
regulatory strategies. But, for better or worse, the action/inaction 
choice is mostly separated (in Adler’s words, partitioned) from legal 
scrutiny. 
 The response from the perspective of Adlerian welfarism might be 
that, after all, what is being raised here is merely a question of im-
plementation. Professor Adler might say that while it is difficult to 
assess RI decisions, it is surely theoretically plausible to do so and, 
therefore, we might, with suitable hard work, apply properly welfa-
rist criteria to both types of decisions. It remains unclear, however, 
how a welfarist standard such as cost-benefit analysis might be de-
ployed in the area of RI-type decisions. Supposing that we had a 
Breyeresque mega-agency which possessed both the legal authority 
and the resources to make comprehensive regulatory decisions, then 
we might consider agency decisions to act through the lens of cost-
benefit analysis. Are the benefits of regulatory action in a certain 
area worth the costs associated with such action? Cost-benefit analy-
sis would seem especially appropriate in this context. Yet, we lack 
such an omnibus agency structure. Instead, each regulatory decision 
in the modern administrative state represents a choice by one agency 
to take action and to choose from an admixture of regulatory strate-
gies. If we would subject both elements of this choice to normative 
evaluation, we would need a fairly complete, and rather complicated, 
set of welfarist criteria. After all, the problem is not merely one of in-
commensurability, but one concerning the practicalities of adminis-
trative decisionmaking. There may well be in the cost-benefit analy-
sis frameworks of Professors Adler and Posner the elements of a 
strategy to deal with the incremental quality of regulatory decision-
making, but suffice it to say that current iterations of cost-benefit 
analysis almost entirely write off RI-type decisions, leaving this to 
the supposedly informed discretion of agencies. To partition such de-
                                                                                                                  
 54. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 55. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36, at 224-31 (discussing the role of “legal cul-
ture” in supporting courts’ reticence to scrutinize recall decisions). 
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cisions is to leave out one of the key elements of regulatory policy-
making in the modern administrative state. 
IV.   THE PROBLEMS WITH COST-BENEFIT WELFARISM 
 Let us try to get out from under serious implementation problems 
and instead concentrate on the theoretical promise of cost-benefit 
analysis as a valuable welfarist approach. Leave aside whether 
courts, legislators, or the agencies themselves are going to police the 
processes of administrative regulation. Is not cost-benefit analysis a 
superior template for regulatory choice given the deficiencies of other 
approaches? Maybe yes, maybe no, although the advantages start to 
disappear when we confront, again, the incrementalist quality of 
regulatory decisionmaking in the modern administrative state. 
 Consider the problem of regulatory jurisdiction. There are many 
different agencies with jurisdiction to regulate certain social and 
economic problems. Indeed, some agency authorities overlap with one 
another, for example, in the environmental and health and safety ar-
eas. To say that each agency ought to employ cost-benefit analysis in 
making regulatory choices is to say, in essence, that each agency de-
cision in which the benefits outweigh the costs adds to overall well-
being. But to say this is to make the same ordinalist error that Adler 
describes elsewhere.56 Decision outcomes may interact with one an-
other; one agency pursuing one strategy may, even if justified by ref-
erence to cost-benefit analysis, impede another agency’s ambitions to 
the detriment of overall well-being. 
 This is, to be sure, not a serious theoretical objection. The enter-
prise of developing welfarist criteria for evaluating regulation can co-
exist with heterogeneous choices made by many cross-cutting institu-
tions. We can take a look at the aggregate of agency decisions and 
ask whether the benefits of regulation at Time A outweigh the costs. 
However, this is a far less pertinent question for the real world of 
agency decisionmaking. Cost-benefit analysis, or any other sort of ac-
tual welfarist methodology, must be helpful in evaluating particular 
regulatory choices in the real world. And these are, as has been ex-
plained, always going to be the choices of specific agencies acting 
within the scope of specific constraints and acting for distinct rea-
sons. The fact that agency jurisdiction, and hence the range of agency 
choice, is constrained means that there will surely be instances in 
which an agency action will yield costs well in excess of the benefits 
of the particular regulation, but there will be the full expectation 
that the overall content of regulation will enhance overall well-being. 
It is hard to understand, for example, elements of contemporary la-
bor or antitrust laws in any other way. 
                                                                                                                  
 56. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 278-79. 
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 Specifically, the result of a decision under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act,57 for example, is to impose discernible, and often dra-
conian, costs on a business enterprise. That these costs are borne by 
an accused “monopolist” does not diminish the fact that this firm 
faces massive costs. So, where are the benefits? They are the advan-
tages associated with freer competition of course, the sine qua non of 
the antitrust laws. Yet, how is any welfarist decision metric going to 
calculate successfully the benefits associated with freer competition 
(benefits which may be speculative and often reaped in the long 
term) and therefore assess these benefits against the measurable 
costs faced by the loser monopolist? 
 The notion that there are cross-cutting effects as a result of multi-
ple agency choices is elementary. Of course, no agency exists in a 
regulatory vacuum. The point here is that such cross-cutting effects 
are the product of regulatory choices, but they are not, in the main, 
taken into account in the making of such choices by any particular 
agency. Regulatory incrementalism means that agencies proceed in 
light of their legal authority, opportunity costs, regulatory philoso-
phies, political pressures, or whatever other criteria is germane to 
their decisionmaking calculus. While we may wish them to take ac-
count of the impact of their decisions on other regulatory choices 
made by other agencies, it is doubtful as either a practical or a theo-
retical matter that agencies so calculate. Indeed, it is the essence of 
proposals to create mega-agencies (such as Justice Breyer’s famous 
proposal in Breaking the Vicious Circle58) or to more effectively em-
power oversight agencies such as the Office of Management and 
Budget to create more effective strategies of monitoring interagency 
effects. In other words, it is in the face of the incrementalist charac-
ter of regulatory administration that various strategies for inter-
agency coordination and regulatory centralization are made.  
V.   CONCLUSION: WELFARISM AND REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION 
 Does this assessment of regulatory incrementalism and moral 
choice cast into doubt not only Adler’s welfarist account of regulation, 
but all normative theories of regulation? In other words, if you take 
seriously the nature of regulatory decisionmaking and institutional 
design, does it follow that you should be impatient with normative 
theories of regulation of any kind? The answer to this question is no. 
Furthermore, the modified cost-benefit analysis defended ably by 
Professors Adler and Posner strikes me as much better than compet-
ing alternatives. Insofar as the case they make for its use rests on 
the judgment that first, welfarist approaches are superior to nonwel-
                                                                                                                  
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 58. BREYER, supra note 31, at 55-81. 
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farist accounts and second, alternative accounts which purport to be 
welfarist are inferior to cost-benefit analysis, the case is an ex-
tremely strong argument and deserves careful, sustained attention 
by scholars on regulation and administrative law. That regulatory 
incrementalism is a phenomenon worth taking fully into account in 
creating welfarist theories of perspective regulation is an amendment 
to, and not really a criticism of, Adlerian welfarism. 
 First, the incrementalist character of contemporary regulatory de-
cisionmaking is not an intrinsic characteristic. We could, after all, 
design our regulatory system very differently. For example, we could 
construct a mega-agency, along the lines suggested by Justice Breyer 
in his book on regulation.59 Such an agency, or another sort of over-
sight mechanism, could serve to assess regulatory administration 
across agencies and across regulatory programs. It could operate to 
ensure that each agency decision increases, at the margin, overall 
well-being and thereby hopes to ensure, in the aggregate run of regu-
latory decisions and in the long run, that regulation is welfare en-
hancing. Or it could ensure that overall regulatory administration is 
welfare enhancing while conceding that certain agency decisions 
might not increase aggregate welfare. Or, perhaps less plausibly, this 
agency could perform an expressly distributive role, seeing to it that 
the costs of regulation are more equitably and efficiently distributed, 
thereby ensuring that our general system of public policy increases 
aggregate well-being. While Professor Adler’s project thus far does 
not advance the case for any or all of these centralizing mega-
strategies, the gist of the normative theory does seem to point in the 
direction of a substantially reconfigured, and perhaps less incremen-
talist, approach to regulatory administration. 
 Second, certain regulatory theories are, I would suggest, more re-
silient than others against the incrementalist quality of agency deci-
sionmaking. For example, QUALY-based60 or health-health61 ap-
proaches seem particularly problematic given the complicated inter-
agency dynamics of regulatory administration.62 Take the simplest 
dilemma: How can we monitor effectively risk-risk tradeoffs when 
different agencies measure the cost of a human life in such different 
ways?63 Conversely, interagency dynamics do not appear to challenge 
strongly proceduralist theories of regulation. Each agency process 
                                                                                                                  
 59. See BREYER, supra note 31, at 55-81. 
 60. “QUALY”—quality-adjusted life years—method is a way to quantify health pref-
erences that attempts to “rank and prioritize health states.” Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 
9, at 84. 
 61. This approach attempts to address the situation where a regulatory action re-
duces one health risk while increasing another. See generally Sunstein, supra note 9. 
 62. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 236-38 (discussing QUALY-based ap-
proaches); see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 83-85. 
 63. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1984-85. 
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can be assessed on the basis of trans-agency standards of due process 
or procedural fairness. 64 Indeed, some versions of proceduralism 
counsel uniformity as a method not only of improving the reality and 
appearance of administrative fairness but also of improving the effi-
ciency of regulatory outcomes on the theory that certain procedural 
forms are more likely correlated with efficient regulation.65 To the ex-
tent that this is correct, regulatory incrementalism jibes nicely with 
certain proceduralist theories. 
 Third, theorists of regulation ought not to be able to pass so easily 
by positive accounts of regulatory administration. While Adler parti-
tions with ease the normative and positive questions, the plausibility 
of the normative case for welfarism as an evaluative talisman must 
inevitably be built upon a positive theory of regulation and admini-
stration. My preliminary assessment of the project is that it reso-
nates strongly with common moral intuitions about both the nature 
and the capacity of the modern administrative state. At the same 
time, though, it sits uneasily within the mainstream of current posi-
tive theories of regulatory administration.66 Although Professor Ad-
ler’s basic project is normative, it is worth asking this: Is there a 
positive theory of regulatory administration which can support the 
very hopeful welfarist view of regulation as a mechanism by which 
public-regarding officials and hard-working agencies can attempt, 
through their sensible decisions, to increase overall well-being? 
 
                                                                                                                  
 64. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE  2 (1985) 
(emphasizing that his book is “an attempt to specify how we ought to think about due proc-
ess questions in a bureaucratic state dedicated to liberal-democratic ideals”). 
 65. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1534-35 (advocating a larger role for discourse 
because it “can enlighten participants about potential community norms,” leading ulti-
mately to “a supportive role [for government] that can enhance individual feelings and self-
worth”). 
 66. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994). 
